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Abstract
We show that two models of the labor market, a Walrasian model and a labor
contracting model, both have an approximate dynamic factor structure. We use this
result to motivate our empirical approach to estimating the cyclical properties of real
wages, which does not impose any structure between real wages and observed cyclical
indicators. In particular, we employ a Bayesian dynamic factor model and longitudinal
microdata to estimate common latent factors driving real wages. We nd that the
comovement of real wages is related to a common factor that exhibits a mild correlation
with the national unemployment rate. Our ndings indicate that overall, roughly
half of the wages move procyclically while half move countercyclically. In addition,
we nd that the estimated common factor can explain only a small portion of wage
variability. We conclude that these facts are inconsistent with the prediction of a
Walrasian labor market model, but consistent with the prediction of a labor contracting
model. Finally, our ndings suggest that although skilled and unskilled wages are
driven by di¤erent common skill factors, these factors cannot explain a signicant
portion of wage variability.
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1 Introduction
The cyclicality of real wages allows us to di¤erentiate between competing theories of the
labor market. However, there has been empirical evidence put forth both for and against
real wages exhibiting procyclical behavior. In this paper we provide new evidence on the
cyclicality of real wages using longitudinal microdata in conjunction with a new econometric
approach, that of a dynamic factor model. The dynamic factor model searches directly for
the largest common cycle in wage data, alleviating the problem of dening the cycle as
any particular macroeconomic variable. The use of individual-level micro data allows us to
determine whether the cyclicality of wages is specic to a certain subset of individuals, which
alleviates the problem of composition bias. Our main objective is to investigate whether
real wages comove over the business cycle, and whether and in what extent their dynamic
properties are consistent with the predictions of a Walrasian or an implicit contracts model.
The factor model also allows us to disentangle the cyclical properties of wages for skilled
(college) and unskilled (no college) workers. To do so, we employ a dynamic latent factor
model in which real wages respond to common as well as skill-specic factors.
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) show that adding appropriate lagged values of the unem-
ployment rate (cyclical indicator) in a wage equation reduces substantially the degree of
wage cyclicality. This raises an issue, not only about the choice of the cyclical indicator but
also about the structure of the relationship between real wages and the cyclical indicator
imposed by the econometrician. We postulate that if real wages comove with the business
cycle then this must be reected on a common, and possibly unobserved, factor. Specically,
our dynamic factor model is motivated by the fact that if real wages exhibit a systematic
relationship with the business cycle, then there should be a common factor which drives the
movement of real wages in the same direction and accounts for a large portion of their vari-
ability. In addition, if the cyclical properties of real wages for skilled and unskilled workers
are not alike, then there should exist skill-specic factors characterized by distinct dynamics.
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We nd that the common factor, which is estimated quite precisely, exhibits a correlation
with the national unemployment rate in the order of 0.64 (0.20 in its rst di¤erence, as used
in the previous studies). The latter indicates that the comovement of real wages derived from
the unemployment rate might be biased to some extent. Moreover, we nd that overall, real
wages exhibit responses with di¤erent signs to a given change in the common factor. We
provide evidence that only the wages of skilled workers exhibit comovement and show that
indeed there are two additional distinct dynamic factors driving the real wages of skilled and
unskilled workers. Finally, we demonstrate that our results are more consistent with the
predictions of an implicit contracts model rather than those of a Walrasian model.
The Bayesian dynamic factor model we employ is part of an emerging literature on
developing techniques to estimate factor models on large datasets (ours has a cross-section
of over two thousand workers). We make a technical contribution to this literature by
developing a method to apply large scale factor models to unbalanced panel-time series
datasets. Following Otrok and Whiteman (1998), Kose, Otrok and Whiteman. (2003) we
proceed with an explicitly Bayesian approach for estimating the parameters and the factors.
Before estimating the factor model we rst show that two competing theories of the
labor market impose a structure on the relationship between real wages and the business
cycle that is in fact the form of an approximate dynamic factor model. The rst model, a
Walrasian model, implies that only productivity a¤ects real wages. The second model, an
implicit contracts model, implies that real wages depend not only on productivity, but also
on an insurance component that results from bargaining between worker and rm. Over
the business cycle the two elements move in oposite directions; marginal productivity is
procyclical whereas the insurance component is countercyclical. Depending on what e¤ect
dominates real wages exhibit procyclical, acyclical or countercyclical behavior.1 We show
that these two models have di¤erent implications for both the relationship between individual
1The theoretical backround of implicit contracts lies in the work of Bailey (1974), Azariadis (1975, 1976)
and Gordon (1974).
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wages and the common factor, as well as the quantitative importance of the factor itself. The
dynamic factor analysis in this paper is then a direct test of the neoclassical labor market
model. It has two advantages over a direct estimation of the structural models. First, we
can consider a large panel of workers of di¤erent types to see if the neoclassical implications
hold for mostindviduals, or for at least a subset of workers. Second, our test of the model
will not lead to a rejection simply because some other feature of the structural model (such
as the consumption Euler equation) rejects the RBC model.
Our ndings suggest that real wages behave in a manner more consistent with models of
labor contracting. This is in the line of the ndings presented by Cooley and Ogaki (1996)
who show that the time series properties of real wages are compatible with Walrasian models
only in the long-run, whereas in the short-run they are better explained by an optimal labor
contract model.2 We nd that the real wages of a majority of skilled workers tend to move
in the same direction after a movement in the common factor. For unskilled workers we
nd that the real wages of roughly half the workers move in one direction, while half move
in the opposite direction. We show that while a labor contracting model does not exclude
any of these observed responses, a Walrasian model does, since real wages correspond solely
to marginal productivities which are positively correlated with the business cycle. Further
evidence for the labor contracting model is provided by the quantitative implications of
the model. The labor contracting model implies that two components of the real wages,
one capturing productivity and the second an insurance motive, o¤set one another after a
movement in the common factor. Thus, we expect that the common factor should not be
quantitatively signicant if this model is largely correct. Our empirical results support this
idea, as the estimated common factor is not signicant. Furthermore, we show that even
skill-specic factors do not appear to be quantitatively signicant. To test the sensitivity
of our results we introduce gender as well as race factors. We nd that our results remain
2Similar results to Cooley and Ogaki are reported by Osano and Inoue (1991), Beaudry and DiNardo
(1991,1995) and Ham and Reilly (2002) who contrast and test Walrasian and labor contacting models. While
the Walrasian models perform poorly in testing, the contracting models cannot be rejected by the data.
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robust while the additional factors do not explain a substantial portion of wage variability.
As previous studies found, there is a considerable amount of individual-specic heterogeneity
in wage data which cannot be captured by a small number of control variables.
Our results are distinct from the existing literature in the use of the individual level
data coupled with the dynamic factor model. At the same time our work is part of a long
history of studying the cyclical behavior of wages and it is useful to briey review some
of the main contributions in the literature. The literature begins with Dunlop (1938) and
Tarshis (1939), who conducted the earliest empirical studies on real wage cyclicality. They
found that Keyness view, in the General Theory, that real wages move countercyclically is
not borne statistically. A simple average measure of real wages does not appear to move
systematically over the business cycle. Thus, many leading macroeconomists have accepted
the acyclical behavior of real wages as a stylized fact of the business cycle.3
Several studies, beginning from Stockman (1983), questioned the validity of the average
measure of wages and stressed the importance of controling for composition bias in obtaining
accurate measurements of wage cyclicality. The idea is that during recessions workers in the
lower tale of the skill distribution are more likely to be laid o¤ and thereby the average wage
might be countercyclicaly biased.4 This argument implies that trueand spuriousmove-
ments in real wages may not be disentangle by a simple average measure. Since then, several
studies estimate econometric models using disaggregated data to control for composition and
aggregation e¤ects. In particular, real wages are regressed on the unemployment rate, as
an indicator of the business cycle, and other worker-specic characteristics. Among others,
these studies, include the work of Bils (1985), Keane, Mo¢ tt and Runkle (1988), Beaudry
and DiNardo (1991), Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) and Ziliak, Wilson and Stone (1999).
Bils, Solon et al. and Ziliak et al. nd that wage acyclicality is simply a statistical illusion
3For instance, the acyclicality of real wages is reported in Lucas (1977), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988),
Mankiw (1989), Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Hall and Taylor (1991), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992),
Gomme and Greenwood (1995), Boldrin and Horvath (1995), Rebelo and King (2000).
4Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) nd evidence of composition bias in the manufacturing sector.
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and that real wages are strongly procyclical. Bils however, nds that the impact of composi-
tion bias is not particularly large and argues that wage procyclicality is due to the inclusion
overtime earnings. Contrary to the previous studies, Keane et al report that real wages are
mildly procyclical after controling for sample selection bias. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991)
extend the wage equation employed by Bils (1985) and Solon et al. (1994) by adding lagged
values of the cyclical indicator to test their theory of implicit contracts. Their nding is
that when appropriate lagged values of the cyclical indicator are taken into consideration
the contemporaneous correlation between real wages and the business cycle goes to zero.
Previous studies have found that the real wages of skilled workers exhibit di¤erent low fre-
quency variation than that of the real wages of unskilled workers. Katz and Murphy (1992),
nd that this behavior can be explained by di¤erent demand shifts for skilled and unskilled
labor. Motivated by those ndings, Acemoglu (1998), develops a theoretical framework to
show that the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers as well as the changes in the
demand for skills are due to skilled-biased technological change which is determined endoge-
nously. Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000), report empirical evidence showing
that wage di¤erentials are due to the existence of capital-skill complementarity which is
present in the production process. These theoretical and empirical arguments have direct
implications in building alternative theories of the labor market. These theories must also
be consistent with the cyclical behavior of wage di¤erentials and thus, knowledge of cyclical
facts of skilled versus unskilled wages is essential. We nd some evidence of distinct cycles
for these two groups of workers before the mid 1980s.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the link
between competing theories of the labor market and our dynamic factor model. Section
3 presents a description of our dataset which is extracted from the National Longitudinal
Surveys (NLS). Section 4, introduces the model and section 5 lays out our econometric
framework and methodology. Section 6 presents our results and section 7 concludes.
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2 Two Theories of Wage Dynamics
2.1 A Neoclassical Model
Our dynamic factor model is motivated by a standard real business cycle model augmented
with a model of measurement error induced by the agency gathering data. This motivation
follows directly from the work of Sargent (1989). We start with a textbookreal business
cycle model, that of King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), which species preferences, technology
and budget constraints. Using standard parametric functional forms for preferences and
technology the model can be log-linearized and solved.5 As is well known the solution of
this model takes the form of a state law of motion and set of decision rules for observable
variables:
St+1 = St + Et+1 (2.1)
Yt = HSt (2.2)
The rst system of equations describes the dynamic evolution of the vector of state
variables and exogenous shocks, such as capital and technology. The second system of
equations are the decision rules, linking the vector of endogenous choices, Yt, to the current
state vector, St. Typical decision variables are labor e¤ort and consumption. Of course, the
real wage would appear in Yt as well.
The real wage of the representative agent in this model is highly procyclical as the wage is
equal to the marginal product of labor. To clarify this implication we follow the conventional
way to decentralize the Pareto optimal equilibria of the model by assuming spot-competitive
labor markets. Let the utility of agent i, U i, be dened over consumption, Cit, and work
e¤ort, Hit such that U iC > 0, U
i
CC < 0, U
i
H < 0 and U
i
HH < 0, where subscripts denote
derivatives. Following the common assumption of RBC models, neutral technology is the
5Typically one assumes CRRA utility, Cobb-Douglass production, AR(1) technology shocks and a linear
capital accumulation equation
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main driving force of business cycle uctuations. Let  i (t) denote the agents marginal
productivity which is an increasing function of technology t. The intratemporal e¢ ciency
condition derived from an RBC model is6
 U iH (Cit; Hit)
U iC (Cit; Hit)
=  i (t) ; (2.3)
This condition results from the agent equating his marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure to the real wage, while rms choose labor such that the marginal
product of labor equals the real wage. The spot-market equilibrium then implies that real
wages equal marginal productivities. Over the business cycle, since both consumption and
work e¤ort are procyclical, their marginal rate of substitution will be procyclical as well.
Consequently, under spot-competitive labor markets we expect that over the business cycle
there is a common (macro) component, , driving the real wages of all agents, and that
these wages move in the same direction. Note that this is true even with heterogeneity in
risk aversion (or labor elasticities).
Our extension of this model assumes that we do not get to observe the truereal wage.
Instead, we have many noisy observations on individual wages from this competitive spot
labor market. The noise is induced by a data-gathering agency which must survey individuals
to nd out their wages. These survey data are riddled with errors, both recall errors from
the agents and statistical errors from the agency itself. Our second system of equations then
becomes:
Yt = HSt +Ut (2.4)
where Ut represents the measurement error and the Yt vector contains the full set of indi-
vudals surveyed.
The empirical model we will use in this paper, a dynamic factor model, is motivated
directly from equations 2.1 and 2.4. These equations take the same general form as a dynamic
6For the sake of simplicity we omit shocks other than t from our notation.
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factor model. To make this link concrete consider the dynamic factor representation for a
vector of wage data yt:
yt = bf t + "t (2.5)
where b is a N x K matrix of factor loadings. The factor ft is assumed to follow an
autoregressive process:7
ft = 
f (L) ft 1 + u
f
t (2.6)
where L denotes the lag operator.
It is clear from comparing equations 2.1 and 2.4 with equations 2.5 and 2.6 that the
dynamic factor model takes the same form as the linearized solution to the real business
cycle model with measurement error. Were one to simulate data from the RBC model and
estimate a factor model on the simulated data, the estimated dynamic factor would then be
the common technology shock in the business cycle model. When we turn to actual data, if
the neoclassical labor market embodying this model is largely correct, then when we estimate
the factor model on wage data we should have two key results. First, as long as the wage
data are not dominated by measurement errors, the common factor should be quantitatively
important for explaining real wage dynamics. Second, wages should all respond with the
same sign to this common factor since in the business cycle model all wages respond positively
to changes in productivity.
2.2 A Wage Contracting Model
Our second labor market model is based on an alternative way to decentralize the Pareto
optimal equilibria by considering a model where agents trade labor contracts. In such a
model, wages and employment are specied in a contract which is the outcome of dynamic
bargaining between workers and rms. The contract, fwi (t), H i (t)g, consists of an hourly
7This model can easily be extended to a model with multiple factors for wages of workers with di¤erent
skill levels. We will do this in a subsequent section.
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wage rate and hours of work that are contingent on the future state of technology. The
contract is such that the e¢ ciency condition 2:3 holds, but the hourly wage rate is not
necessarily equal to  i (t). The hourly wage not only responds to changes in productivity but
also provides insurance to risk averse agents against business cycle uctuations.8 Contrary
to the spot market case, under reasonable assumptions, in equilibrium the wage will not be
strongly correlated with productivity. This is due to the fact that the wage embodies an
insurance component which minimizes their uctuations. Furthermore, a given change in 
may induce the wages of some agents to increase while others to decrease. Hence, responses
of di¤erent signs to a given change in the common component are consistent with the theory
of implicit contracts. To illustrate these two points, we provide a simple example where
consumption equals labor earnings that is, Cit = witHit, and the agents di¤er in terms of
their aversion toward risk. Assuming separable CRRA preferences, condition 2:3 can be
solved for the equilibrium wage (see Boldrin and Horvath (1995)):9
wit = i [ i (t)]
1
i

T  Hit
Hit

(2.7)
where i > 0, i is the agents coe¢ cient of risk aversion and T is the workers total time
endowment. (Note that the linearized version of equation 2.7 would enter the decision
rules 2.2 or 2.4 in the state space system describing the model dynamics.) In this case,
the equilibrium wage is comprised of two components, productivity and insurance (which
is the ratio of leisure to labor). Productivity is strongly procyclical whereas the insurance
component is countercyclical because hours of work are procyclical. The latter o¤sets the
increases (decreases) in productivity and thus, wages do not appear to respond strongly to
technology shocks. Notice that parameter i controls the elasticity of the hourly wage to the
8The idea is based on the assumption that capital markets are inadequate to fully bu¤er the agents
consumption against adverse shocks.
9The same condition for the equilibrium wage can be derived when preferences are nonseparable. In that
case however, parameter i is the within period elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure
(see Pourpourides (2008)).
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marginal product of labor uctuations. Depending on the value of i, for some individuals
the e¤ect of the insurance component may dominate the e¤ect of productivity and thereby,
the change in their wage, in response to an increase in , will have a negative sign. The
more risk averse an agent is the more likely she/he is to have a negative wage response to
an increase in . To summarize, the contracting model rst implies that real wages will
not exhibit a strong commmon cycle, implying that any common dynamic factor should
have little explanatory power for real wage uctuations. Second, if there is heterogeneity in
preferences than the model predicts that the factor loading coe¢ cients in the dynamic factor
model will have both positive and negative signs.
3 The Data
Our data on hourly wages are taken from the National Longitudinal Survey, which is a
nationally representative sample of 12,686 men and women born in the years 1957 through
1964. All respondents were interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994. We use the time
series from 1979 to 1993 and collect information from the survey on employment, wages and
sociodemographic characteristics.10
The advantage of the NLS panel data set is that it avoids problems related to having a
changing work force and enables us to control for various worker characteristics. Unlike the
Michigans Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), where the hourly wage in a given year
is the ratio of the annual income to the annual hours of work, in the NLS the respondents
directly report their hourly rate of pay in the week of the interview. Thus, the advantage
10The text of question for the years 1979 to 1993 asks the respondents to report amount earned that includes
tips, overtime and bonuses before deductions. The hourly rate of pay in survey year 1994 is calculated a
little di¤erently. Respondents are rst asked if they are paid hourly; if so, then that reported hourly wage is
used in the created hourly rate. Presumably, this hourly wage does not inlcude tips, overtime and bonuses.
Otherwise, if the respondents report other than an hourly wage, then they are asked for earnings that include
tips, overtime, and bonuses (just as in the years 1979-1993) from which hourly rate of pay is created. Given
that there is a di¤erence in methodology for 1994 we exclude this year from our sample.
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of using NLS over PSID is that hourly wages are less contaminated by recall bias.11 12 We
accept only those respondents that meet the following restrictions: 1) Must be at least 18
years old at the interview date; 2) Are not self-employed; 3) There must be at least 7 years
of available time series observations; 4) Are not enrolled in school the last 2 years of the
sample period.
After removing the respondents who do not meet our criteria our sample contains 2,123
individuals and 31,845 person-year observations. We provide further analysis of our sample
by classifying individuals into 8 broadly dened categories on the basis of skills, gender and
race. We dene skilled workers as those having at least a college degree and unskilled workers
as the remainder of the sample. Race is dened based on the information provided by NLS,
which classies the respondents into three race groups, Hispanic, black and non-black/non-
Hispanic. We group the sample into two main categories. One category consists of blacks and
Hispanic and the other one consists of the remainder of the sample, which is assumed to be
largely non-minority. A detailed description of the composition of our sample can be found
in Table 1. The wage measure is deated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to provide a
real wage measure normalized in terms of 1983 CPI dollars. The data are log-rst-di¤erenced
and demeaned before estimation.13
One potential issue that we face is that our dataset is an unbalanced panel as missing
observations constitute 27.7% of the sample. Missing observations arise in the NLS because
either the respondent is not interviewed or he/she is enrolled at school or he/she is unem-
ployed. Wage observations where respondents are enrolled at school but at the same time
report a positive wage rate are treated as missing observations. (Information about missing
observations for each category can be found in Table 1.) One approach to solving this prob-
11The reported hourly wage refers to the respondents current or most recent job at the time of the
interview. In the NLS survey the current or most recent job is refered to as job #1 which, after 1982, is
nearly always the CPS job.
12We do not use the newest NLS survey of 1997 because it is still in progress and a shorter sample period
is currently available.
13This treatment of the data is the same form as the log deviations from steady-state that would come
from a RBC model.
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lem is to simply drop the time series containing missing observations. Since this signifcantly
reduces the sample size, and may induce a selection bias, we take an alternative approach.
We treat the missing oberservations as random variables and estimate them as part of our
econometric model. Our methodology for estimating the missing observations is described
in section 5.1.
4 The Dynamic Factor Model
To estimate the cyclical properties of real wages we use a dynamic factor model along the
lines of Sargent and Sims (1977), Stock and Watson (1989) and Kose et al. (2003). This
statistical model di¤ers from the models traditionally employed to estimate wage cyclicality.
In previous work, wages are associated with cyclical indicators (eg. the unemployment rate).
Of course, if one chooses the wrongcyclical indicator the results will be biased towards
nding acyclical wages. The factor model, by denition, extracts the largest common cycle(s)
in the wage data. Hence, we are nding the maximum possible amount of cyclicality in the
wage data. Our model then gives the best possible chance to the theories in favor of cyclical
wages.
To be concrete, let yt be a vector of real wages for N individuals at time t. Then, yt can
be explained by a vector ft of K common factors and a vector "t of N individual-specic
noise terms. We assume that ft and "t evolve according to the following autoregressions:
ft = 
f (L) ft 1 + u
f
t (4.1)
and
"t =  (L) "t 1 + ut (4.2)
where f (L) and  (L) are K x Q and N x P matrices of polynomials in the lag operator,
respectively. The vectors of disturbances uft and ut are assumed to be zero mean and
13
normally distributed with
E

uft u
f 0


=
8><>: M
f for t = 
0 otherwise
and E (utu0 ) =
8><>: M for t = 0 otherwise
where Mf and M are diagonal matrices. In other words, the factors are independent from
each other and the individual-specic noise terms are independent across individuals. The
statistical model for yt is
yt = bf t + "t (4.3)
where b is a N x K matrix of factor loadings.
We focus our attention in characterizing the dynamic e¤ects of three factors. The common
dynamics of real wages across all individuals are captured by the common factor f c. The
factors f s (where s= skilled or unskilled) drive the wages of a subset of individuals with the
same skill level. Thus, having panel data on N individuals, each observed for T time periods,
our model for the real wage of individual i is
yi;t = bc;if
c
t + bs;if
s
t + "i;t
for i = 1; 2; ::; N ; s=skilled or unskilled; t = 1; ::; T
(4.4)
where bj;i is the factor loadingthat captures the sensitivity of the wage of worker i to factor
j. The corresponding idiosyncratic error "i;t follows a pi-order autoregression:
"i;t = i;1"i;t 1 + i;2"i;t 2 + :::+ i;pi"i;t pi + ui;t (4.5)
where i;j represents the exposure of the idiosyncratic error to its jth lag and ui;t iidN (0; 2i ).
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Likewise, the law of motion of factor j is given by the AR (qi) process:
f jt = fk;1f
j
t 1 + fk;2f
j
t 2 + :::+ fk;qif
j
t qi + u
f
k;t
for k = c, s
(4.6)
where fk;j represents the exposure of factor k to its jth lag and u
f
k;t iidN
 
0; 2f;k

.
5 Estimation
We estimate the factors and the parameters of the econometric model 4:4   4:6 using the
Bayesian approach developed in Otrok and Whiteman (1998). We simulate from the joint
posterior of the parameters and factors using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo alogorithm. The
main part of their procedure is a Gibbs sampler that sequentially draws the parameters
conditional on the factors, and then the factors conditional on the parameters.14
Since the covariance matrix M is diagonal, conditional on the factors, the system 4:4
consists of N independent regression models. Hence, conditional on the factors, we use
Chib and Greenbergs (1994) procedure to draw the regression parameters separately for
each equation. Since the model has 2,123 equations this feature of their procedure makes
the estimation feasible for our dataset. A full derivation and description of the relevant
conditional densities can be found in Otrok and Whiteman (1998).
The (conjugate) prior densities for bi, i, fk and 
2
i are chosen to be the same as
those used in Otrok and Whiteman (1998). Specically, the prior for the factor loadings
bi is Gausian with zero mean and precision (1/variance) equal to 0:01. The persistence
parameters of the innovation and factor processes i and fk are also Gausian with zero
mean and precision equal to 0:85 for all lags. The prior of the idiosyncratic innovation
variance 2i is an inverted gamma  (=2; =2) with  = 6 and  = 0:001. These priors are
14The scales of the factor loadings are separately identied from those of the factors by normalizing the
variances of the factors to a constant, as is common in the literature
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fairly di¤use and the main results are not very sensitive to values of prior parameters around
the ones chosen.
5.1 Missing Observations
Our dataset poses a technical problem due to missing observations for wages in some years
for many of the survey respondents. Instead of ommiting the time series we assume that
the missing observations are random variables and we estimate these missing observations
as part of our econometric model. We do so by rst deriving the distribution of the missing
data points conditional on the parameters and factors. This distribution depends on both
cross-sectional information as well as the time series data before and after the missing obser-
vation. Intuitively, the distribution depends on both a forecastand backcastof the missing
observation using the univariate time series data itself, and the parameters governing the
dynamics of the time series. It also includes cross-sectional information: the factor loading
is used along with the factor itself to predictthe missing value. Our procedure combines
both types of information. A direct way to do this is by applying the Kalman lter and then
smoothing the means and the variances by backward induction. Details of the procedure are
in the Appendix.
Our Gibbs sampler then has three blocks. In block one we condition on factors and model
parameters to draw the missing observations (for those time series with missing data). Then,
in block two we treat the missing data drawn in block one as data and draw the model
parameters. Finally, conditional on the drawn missing data and parameters we draw the
factors. The procedure is repeated 5000 times after an initial burnin of 500 draws.
6 Empirical Results
Our primary interest is to provide answers to three questions: First, do real wages exhibit
a systematic relationship with the business cycle? Second, is the behavior of real wages
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consistent with the prediction of a Walrasian or a labor contracting model? Third, are the
wages of skilled and unskilled workers subject to a signicantly di¤erent degree of cyclical
variation? To answer the rst and second questions we focus on the importance of the
common factor in equation 4.4 as well as the signs of the wage responses to a change in
the common factor. To answer the third question we focus on the characteristics of the
dynamic behavior of the skill factors and their relative contribution in accounting for real
wage uctuations.
Since the factors (common and skill specic) are estimated simultaneously, the skill fac-
tors are capturing the comovement in a specic skill group conditional on comovement al-
ready accounted for by the factor common to all wages. That is, skilled (or unskilled) wages
may comove simply because all wages comove. Our model determines instead how much
comovement there is in skilled wages that is not common to wages of all skill levels. This
conditioning is important, as it alleviates the danger of looking only at, say, the wages of
skilled workers, and mistakenly concluding that skilled wages have a common cycle, when
that cycle is in fact common to a wider array of individuals.
6.1 The Dynamic Factors
Figure 1 presents the mean of the posterior distribution of the factors along with corre-
sponding 95 percent posterior coverage intervals. The bounds of the condence intervals
are tight which shows that the factors are estimated quite precisely. The common factor
is characterized by the peaks of 1983 and 1990 and the trough of 1987. The peaks occur
at roughly the same time that NBER recessions occur. In particular, the peak of the 1983
lags the NBER recession of the 1982 whereas the peak of 1990 leads the NBER recession
of 1991. The variable used by the previous studies as an indicator of the business cycle is
the rst di¤erence of the annual national unemployment rate. In fact, our common factor
exhibits a mildly positive correlation of 0.64 with the level of the national unemployment
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rate and a much smaller correlation of 0.20 with its the rst di¤erence.15 It is the case that
our estimates suggest that macroeconomic conditions are relevant, at least to some extent,
for the cyclical behavior of real wages. However, even though the level of the unemploy-
ment indicator captures a portion of real wage cyclicality, assuming that unemployment is
the common wage cycle biases the estimated comovement of real wages as the estimated
common cycle is not simply the unemployment rate.
The skill-specic factors appear less cyclical than the aggregate factor and have distinct
dynamics from each other. The correlation coe¢ cient between the skilled and the unskilled
factors is 0.26 which signies that real wages embody a distinct component which is specic
to skills.16 The correlation coe¢ cient between the skill factors and the unemployment rate
is almost zero. Both factors exhibit substantial variation until 1985 and relatively smooth
afterwards.
To examine whether common uctuations are more persistent than skill specic uctu-
ations we report the rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cients of the factors. Our estimates
indicate that aggregate common uctuations are highly persistent just like the unemploy-
ment rate. The common uctuations of unskilled wages are also highly persistent with an
autocorrelation coe¢ cient of 0.68. Contrary to the common and the unskilled factors, the
skilled factor exhibits a negative autocorrelation of -0.21 which suggests that it is weakly
mean reverting. The di¤ering dynamics of the skilled factor suggests that there are forces
unique to skilled workers driving their wages. If we interpret this in light of our theoreti-
cal models, then this would suggest skill-specic productivity shocks. We do not push this
interpretation very hard though, since we will see that these factors are not quantitatively
important.
15The NLS interviews usually take place around March and thus the reported wages better correspond
to that period. The correlations are slightly bigger if Marchs unemployment rate is used rather than the
annual rate. Specically, the correlation between the level of the unemployment rate and the common factor
is 0.73 while the correlation with its rst di¤erence is 0.41.
16The assumption in the econometric model is that the innovations between the two skill factors is zero.
However, this assumption is not imposed in the estimation so the skill factor can be correlated if the data
so indicate. We do impose that that aggregate factor is orthogonal to the two skill factors.
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Next we examine the direction to which a change in each of the factors a¤ects real wages.
Figure 2 displays the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the factor loadings. The
CDFs illustrate that roughly half of real wages in our sample respond positively to the
factors while the other half respond negatively. Thus, overall there is no distinct pattern
of the responses of real wages to the common factors. Figure 3 indicates however that the
majority of the real wages of skilled workers (about 75%) respond negatively to a given
change in the common factor thus, exhibiting a higher degree of comovement relative to that
of the wages of unskilled workers.17
As discussed in section 2, a neoclassical model of the labor market would imply that
all wages respond with the same sign to the common factor (which would be interpreted
as technology). On the other hand, a wage contracting model with some heterogeneity in
preferences predicts that the factor loading coe¢ cients di¤er in sign and magnitude. Our
results for the signs of the wage responses suggest that the labor market is better charac-
terized by a model of labor contracting rather than a Walrasian model. Although skilled
wages tend to move modestly in the same direction after a change in the common factor,
such behavior is also consistent with the labor contracting model. What is more, as will be
shown in the following subsection, the common factor cannot explain a signicant portion
of wage variability either for skilled or unskilled wages, which is precisely the prediction of
an implicit contracts model.
Our nding that skilled wages exhibit a higher degree of comovement than unskilled
wages, coupled with our nding that skilled and unskilled factors exhibit distinct dynamics
indicates that skilled and unskilled wages exhibit a di¤erent degree of cyclical variation. This
result seems to stand in contrast to the nding of Keane and Prasad (1993) who nd that
skilled and unskilled workers are subject to essentially the same degree of cyclical variation
in wages. However, the quantitative signicance of the factors we estimate appears to be
17Recall that with a factor model the signs of the factors and factor loadings are not separately identied.
The key point is the percent of wages that move in the same direction, not the positive or negative aspect
of the comovement.
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small, so we prefer to focus more on the Walrasian versus Contracting labor models debate,
rather than di¤erences across skill levels.
6.2 Quantitative Signicance of Wage Factors
To examine the quantitative signicance of the cyclical factors we estimate the contribution of
each of them to the overall variability of observables. Since the factors and the idiosyncratic
component are orthogonal to each other it is straightforward to partition the variance of each
observable into the fraction that is due to each of the underlying factors and the idiosyncratic
component. The variance of observable i can be written as (by applying the Var operator
to equation 4.4)
var (yi;t) = (b
c
i)
2 var (f ct ) + (b
s
i )
2 var (f st ) + var ("i;t) (6.1)
Then, the fraction of the volatility explained by factor j is
 
bji
2
var
 
f jt

var (yi;t)
(6.2)
Reporting the full posterior distributions of all 2,123 posteriors is infeasible, so instead we
report information on the distribution of the posterior means of the 2,123 variance decom-
positions. (In most cases that we examined the posterior coverage intervals were tightly
concentrated about the mean.) Figure 4 displays frequencies and CDFs of variance decom-
positions across the skilled, the unskilled and the whole sample. Table 2 presents analytically
the number of individuals falling in each interval of variance shares attributable to each of
the factors and the idiosyncratic component.
The common factor explains, on average, no more than 9% of the variance of real wages.
We obtain similar results when we examine the impact of the factor separately on skilled
and unskilled wages. Overall, the common factor accounts for 20% or less of the wage
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variability for 88% of the workers in the sample. The share of variance attributable to the
common factor exceeds 50% for only 1% of the workers. In other words, the wages of only
1% of the respondents are overwhelmingly inuenced by common economic conditions, as
reected through the dynamic factor. These results show that the factor plays a relatively
minor role in accounting for wage movements over the business cycle. Consequently, the
explanatory power of the common factor is inadequate to justify claims for strong procyclical
or countercyclical movements of real wages. This nding is also consistent with the prediction
of the labor contracting model. Recall that the equilibrium wage under the contract is driven
by a procyclical (marginal productivity) and a countercyclical (insurance) component. The
latter implies that two o¤seting e¤ects reduce the response of the wage to a given change in
the common factor, reecting a quantitavely insignicant common factor.
Likewise, the skill factor explains, on average, no more than 10% of wage variability and
accounts for 20% or less of wage variability for 84% of the workers in the sample. Those
ndings reinforce the evidence of previous studies which show that skilled and unskilled
wages face essentially the same degree of cyclical variation.
These results are also inconsistent with a xed nominal wage contract model. If we
augment the neoclassical model in section 2.1 with a model where nominal wages are set
for a xed number of periods, then we would nd that at least half, or a quarter of the
wages, depending on the nominal wage contract length, would depend almost completely on
the common factor. For example, if we have nominal wages xed for 1 period, and half of
workers get to change wages in a given period, then our common factor would nd that more
than half of the workers respond to the common factor.18
Notably, the idiosyncratic component is an important factor of wage uctuations. It can
explain more than 70% of wage variability for 78% of the workers. It is possible that this
18If productivity were iid then exactly 50 percent of the indivudals would be driven by the common factor,
but since there is serial correlation in productivity, wages in adjacent periods would be related to each other,
which would be picked up by the dynamics in the factor. This would lead to more than 50 percent of the
sample having a quantitatively important response to the common factor .
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residual may include the e¤ects of characteristics such as gender and race. To examine the
robustness of our main results we extend our model by including gender and race factors.
Specically, we assume that there is a specic factor driving the wages of male workers and
a separate factor driving the wages of female workers. As for the race characteristics we
follow the NLS classication and assume two broadly dened race factors, one driving the
wages of blacks and hispanics and another driving the wages of the remainder. We call the
latter group nonminority and the former group minority. For instance, in this setting, the
real wage of a skilled female worker who belongs to a minority group is driven by ve factors,
one that drives the wages of all workers, one that drives the wages of all skilled workers, one
that drives the wages of all female workers, one that drives the wages of all minority workers
and nally a factor that is specic to the worker. We nd that the gender and the race
factors have little to no explanatory power and do not change our main results. Thus, they
are not retained in the nal statistical model. The result that there is a signicant amount
of individual-specic heterogeneity which cannot be explain by small number of factors is no
di¤erent from ndings of previous studies.19
7 Concluding Remarks
The cyclical behavior of real wages has long been a central issue in macroeconomics. Our
contribution to this literature is to use a dynamic factor model with longitudinal data to
nd the largest possible common cycle in real wages. We rst show that the factor model
itself is motivated directly from two RBC models with alternative theories of the labor
market. The virtue of the dynamic factor framework is that we need not subject the full
range of implications of the RBC model to a test, rather we focus on implications for the
labor market. It also allows us to use longitudinal micro data from the NLS to control for
composition and aggregation e¤ects. Our model allows us to analyze the degree and the
19For instance, the R2 of the wage equation estimated by Bils (1985) is in the order of 2%.
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nature of the comovement of real wages across the entire population as well as separately for
skilled and unskilled workers. It also enables us to quantify the contribution of each factor
in wage variability.
We nd that the common factor is mildly correlated with the national unemployment
rate which is the common component of real wages assumed by some previous studies.
This indicates that macroeconomic conditions do have an impact on real wages, though the
impact is quantitatively small. We then demonstrate that implicit contract models are more
appropriate in understanding the time series properties of individual real wages. First, we
nd that roughly half the wages in our sample are procyclical and half are countercyclical.
Such pattern cannot be generated by a neoclassical model of the labor market because wages
correspond only to marginal productivities which are positively correlated with the business
cycle. On the other hand, wage responses of di¤erent signs over the business cycle are possible
in a model where rms and heterogeneous workers trade (implicit) labor contracts. Second,
variance decompositions show that, on average, the common factor accounts for only a small
fraction of wage uctuations. The latter is consistent with a labor contracting model where
the wage is composed of two o¤seting elements. Our ndings also suggest that although
skilled and unskilled wages are driven by di¤erent common skill factors, these factors cannot
explain a signicant portion of wage variability.
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Appendix: Factor Models with Unbalanced Panels
In this appendix we describe the procedure for estimating the missing observations. This
procedure forms one block of our Gibbs sampler. In block one we draw the parameters
conditional on factors and missing data. In block two we draw the factors conditional on
parameters and missing data. In block three we draw the missing data conditional on
parameters and factors. In essence, we ll in the missing observations of the unbalanced
panel using information in both the model and available data. It is this last block that we
describe in this appendix. The rst two blocks are described in Otrok and Whiteman (1998).
Let i;t = i;1i;t 1 + ::: + i;pii;t pi + ui;t where i;t = yi;t   bc;if ct   bs;if st . Then, the
following state space system is obtained:
yi;t = A
0
ixt +H
0 i;t +wi;t (A1)
i;t+1 = Fii;t + vi;t+1 (A2)
where
yi;t = yi;t, i;t =

i;t i;t 1    i;t pi+1
0
, xt =

1 f ct 1    f ct qi f st 1    f skt qi
0
wi;t = bc;i u
f
c;t + bs;iu
f
s;t, vi;t =

ui;t 01x(pi 1)
0
, A0i = Bi, Bi =

bc;i bs;i

H0 =

1 01x(pi 1)

,  =

c;1    c;qi 0    0
0    0 s;1    s;qi

, Fi=

i;1    i;pi 1 i;pi
I(pi 1)x(pi 1) 0(pi 1)x1

The variance matrix of vi;t is
E
 
vi;tv
0
i;

= Qi=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
26664
2i 0    0
0       ...
...       ...
0       0
37775 for t = 
0pi x pi otherwise
Consequently, the system (A1)  (A2) satises the following conditions:
1. E
 
w2i;t

= b2c;i
2
f;c + b
2
s;i
2
f;s = Ri
2. E (wi;twi; ) = 0, and E (vi;twi; ) = 0 for all t and 
Equations (A1) and (A2) are the observation and state equations, respectively. The
recursion of the Kalman lter begins with bi;0j0 which denotes the unconditional mean of
i;1, where bi;0j0 = E  i;1 = 0, The asssociated Mean Square Error (MSE) is Pi;0j0 =
 = E
 
i;1
0
i;1

where  = FF0 + Q. To enable the recursion steps we replace missing
observations with values drawn from the distribution of the data,20
20Alternatively, instead of drawing a value from L (), we can merely skip the updating equations by
assuming that bi; j = bi; j 1 and Pi; j 1 = Pi; j 1. The results do not change signicantly under this
alternative.
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L
 
yi;t=;i;t; :::; i;t p

=
 
22i
 1=2
exp

  1
22i
 
yi;t   byi;t=t 12
where byi;t=t 1 = yi;t i;t+i;1i;t 1+:::+i;pi;t p. The transition from bi;t 1jt 1 and Pi;t 1jt 1
to bi;tjt and Pi;tjt is given by the following set of equations21
bi;tjt 1 = Fibi;t 1jt 1
Pi;tjt 1 = FiPi;t 1jt 1F0i +Qibytjt 1 = A0ixt +H0bi;tjt 1bi;tjt = bi;tjt 1 +Pi;tjt 1H  H0Pi;tjt 1H+Ri 1  yt   bytjt 1
Pi;tjt = Pi;tjt 1  Pi;tjt 1H
 
H0Pi;tjt 1H+Ri
 1
H0Pi;tjt 1
Since our goal is to form an inference about the value of i;t based on the full set of
time series we compute the smoothed estimate bi;tjT and the corresponding MSE, Pi;tjT , by
conditioning on next periods observation that is, bi;tjT = bi;tjt + Ji bi;t+1jT   bi;t+1jt and
Pi;tjT = Pi;tjt + Jit
 
Pi;t+1jT  Pi;t+1jt

J0it where Jit = Pi;tjtF
0
iP
 1
i;t+1jt.
22 Wherever there is a
missing observation, in each loop of the Markov chain, we replace it with yi;t = 
1
i;t+ bc;if
c
t +
bs;if
s
t where 
1
i;t is the rst element of the drawing 

i;t from N
bi;tjT ;Pi;tjT. The values
for the missing observations are drawn right after the completion of steps 1 and 2 of the
estimation procedure.
21The formulas were directly taken from Hamiltons (1994) time series textbook. For more details con-
cerning the algorithm refer to Hamilton pp. 377-381.
22Refer to Hamilton (1994) pp.394-397.
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Figure 4 Variance Decompositions for the Factors
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Table 1: Composition of the Sample
category # of people % in sample % of missing obs.
skilled males minority 40 1.90 0.86
skilled males nonminority 89 4.19 1.80
skilled females minority 60 2.82 1.16
skilled females nonminority 98 4.61 1.99
unskilled males minority 528 24.90 6.30
unskilled males nonminority 452 21.30 4.88
unskilled females minority 428 20.14 5.70
unskilled females nonminority 428 20.14 5.08
aggregate 2123 100.0 27.77
males 1109 52.23 13.84
females 1014 47.77 13.93
skilled 287 13.52 5.81
unskilled 1836 86.48 21.96
minority 1056 49.74 14.02
nonminority 1067 50.26 13.75
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